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DIFFERENT/A

Semerari's essay-but this is true
of all the others-is
mainly concerned with the issue of freedom and
destiny, and thus with what today, in
the era of technology and danger theorized by Heidegger, still can and
must be thought. By way of confronting Heidegger on the ground of
his confrontations with other thinkers
of the Western tradition, the whole
volume becomes an important source
of critical orientations for the future
of thinking, as well as a serious
reflection on themes whose problematics have not yet been exhausted.
BRUNO GULLI
CUNY Graduate Center, New York

II gioco dei limiti. L'idea di
esistenza in Nietzsche.
Furia Semerari.
Bari: Laterza, 1993. 224 pp.

For the past forty years, Nietzsche
has been a major interlocutor in contemporary Italian critical thought. He
been subjected, in nearly chronological succession, to compelling interpretations by existentialists, structuralists, Marxists, thinkers of the
negative and of difference,
and
hermeneuticians. Some readings, in
particular, have become witness to
• and icons of specific intellectual-cultural moods, and here we can briefly
recall the influential monographs by
Gianni Vattimo, Antonio Penzo,
Giangiorgio Pasqualotto, Giuseppe
Masini, Massimo Cacciari, Giorgio
Colli. In each case, Nietzsche's peculiar textuality was made to support

the thesis that his Overman was a
model for liberation and emancipation, or that he was systematically
misrepresented for the early part of
the century, especially in Germany.
On another front, Nietzsche's notion
of difference manifested significantly
disparate traits to the Italians than it
did to the French; thus he was read as
the ultimate hermeneutician of endless interpretation or, on yet another
reading, as the last expression of an
utterly fragmented subject(ivity) of
metaphysical thought, the announcer
of achieved nihilism. Of course,
artists and writers also have dug
inside the endlessly configurable
Nachlass, especially in the seventies
and through the eighties. One aspect
which recurs often is the elusive rapport between body and meaning, life
and art, the dynamic of the creative
impulse, life itself as constantly
changing positions; "gaming", as we
might say with Lyotard.
Fulvio Semerari' s book intends to
re-read the Colli-Montinari corpus in
terms of a problematic concept which
is perhaps not sufficiently thematized
by Nietzsche himself, at least explicitly, but which can serve as the background web or linkage among a constellation of other assertions and
divagations only apparently contradictory or unrelated. This is the concept of limit, which according to
Semerari takes on several meanings
and on the basis of which we can further penetrate and pay homage to the
thinker who refuses to be, who cannot be, categorized, and seems destined to spur and produce ever-different interpretations. Beginning with
that
Karl Lowith' s observation
Nietzsche's "travailled thinking is

reviews
more like an experimenting along the
way than a leading up to knowledge," Semerari claims that existence
itself becomes a play of limits, an
incessant gaming with boundaries,
an endless, on-going testing of parameters and possibilities for a viable
existence, and for its sense. Nietzsche
had highlighted this dynamic already
in The Birth of Tragedy, where the
Apollonian measure gives value and
form to the untrammeled manifestation
of Dionisian
impulses.
Unchecked freedom is not really liberating, means nothing in and by
itself, much like the state of inebriation, which could paradoxically turn
into a negation of life. For Nietzsche
it is always a question of limit, for the
subject is always positioned, with a
given perspective, within a given set
of relations. The virtue of superior
intellects,
of post-metaphysical
humans will consist precisely in the
attitude and the manner one deals
with inescapable de-limitation. And
this can be foregrounded through the
measure of reason. From this perspective,
Semerari
can place
Nietzsche squarely in the tradition of
Kant, insofar as the First Critique was
written precisely to save reason from
"obscurity" by keeping it "within the
limits of experience" and having it
recognize moreover the limits of its
possibility (8). On the other hand, it is
precisely his acute awareness of how
limits can be, once they take concrete
shape in rules, disciplines, grammars,
extremely constrictive, homogenizing, depersonalizing.
Historically,
and in its pejorative or repressive
symbolic concretion, the notion of
limit has set in motion the codes of
moralism and practiced the channels
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of dogmatism. Nietzsche observed
how the body, how experience itself,
inevitably must and will vanish. In
this sense, by having to philosophize
with a hammer, Nietzsche lands
squarely on the cusp between latemodernity and an amorphous postmodernity, but surely beyond anything Kant ever imagined.
Yet
Semerari insists that the destruction
of limits is only one phase in an idea
or form of thinking which must of
necessity also be constructive, committed as it is to continued self-overcoming, accepting of the shaping of
what's in the present, unafraid of a
predisposition
toward what may
come. In short, take Life as experiment, as experience of endless limitations, and finally also as movable
barrier, an interplay of possibilities,
pure play. But here is the twist: not,
of course, the pure play of signifiers
of Francophiliac memory, but rather,
the play of referents and symbolic
systems, pointing to the resources of
one's own life and culture, the value
of living consisting precisely in the
way through whatever the circumstances may turn out to be for
Semerari's Nietzsche. In short, living
is not so much against but in relation
to the limits one may unexpectedly
encounter, vita natural durante. It is a
hermeneutically
enticing position,
deserving further development on
the part of the author and critics
places Furio
alike. It certainly
Semerari authoritatively in the rich
archipelago of Italian Nietzscheans.
PETER CARRAVETIA
Queens College, CUNY

